Labor Supply, Flexible Hours and Real Estate Agents by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Winkler, Daniel T.
Labor Supply, Flexible Hours and Real Estate Agents 
By: John D. Benjamin, Peter Chinloy, Daniel T. Winkler 
This is the accepted version of the following article: 
Benjamin, J. D., Chinloy, P., Winkler, D.T. (2009). Labor Supply, Flexible Hours and Real 
Estate Agents. Real Estate Economics 37(4), 747-767., 
which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6229.2009.00262.x., 
***© American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. Reprinted with permission. 
No further reproduction is authorized without written permission from the American Real 
Estate and Urban Economics Association & Wiley. This version of the document is not the 
version of record. Figures and/or pictures may be missing from this format of the 
document. *** 
Abstract: 
Real estate agents have flexibility in choosing hours and employers. These responses are tested 
with a five-equation recursive model. Agents choose between full- and part-time work. The 
conditional wage measures productivity adjusted for self-selection to each status. Hours worked 
in each status depend on the fitted after-tax wage and household income, yielding flexible supply 
elasticities. Using a 2005 survey of 8,450 U.S. real estate agents, a year of experience raises the 
full-time hourly wage by 2.5%. Conditional hours worked decline by 0.6%, implying an earnings 
return of 1.9% per year of experience. The labor supply elasticity for full-time agents is 0.21; it is 
almost zero for part timers. 
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Article: 
In labor markets few workers are able to set their own hours. Those paid on salary often have a 
block of hours set by their employer and a fixed schedule. Those paid by the hour receive 
compensation typically only when called in by the employer. 
This situation is not generally the case in real estate. Real estate licensees, as agents and brokers, 
set their own hours and are paid principally on commission.1 They have flexibility of labor 
supply and mobility between firms. Apart from relevance to the industry, these arrangements 
allow theories of labor supply to be estimated directly. In addition to measuring elasticities, the 
effects of skills, demographics, personal characteristics and also market and firm control 
variables are testable. 
This article estimates a flexible labor supply equation allowing for differences between full- and 
part-time status. The structural form has five equations and three recursive steps. The agent 
selects whether to work full time. Conditional on this selection there are sequential separate full- 
and part-time equations for wages and hours. With no difference between working full or part 
time and no self-selection, there is a single wage-hour structure resulting in two estimating 
equations. Even in this two-equation case, agents choose their hours and respond to wage and tax 
changes. 
The empirical application is to 8,450 U.S. real estate agents surveyed in 2005. Data are available 
on hours worked, agent compensation and household income as well as skills and demographics. 
Full-time status for the empirical implementation follows regulatory guidelines for benefit 
eligibility, requiring working 20 hours or more per week.2 
A year of experience yields full-time agents a return about twice that of part timers. A year of 
experience raises the wage by 2.5% for a full-time agent, adjusted for self-selection. Hours 
worked fall by 0.6%, leading to an earnings return of 1.9%. 
The labor supply elasticity for a real estate agent is low, even when allowing for flexible hours. 
For a full-time agent the elasticity is 0.21, and it is near zero for part timers. The results are 
robust to specification. Including gender, race and ethnicity, the labor supply elasticity is no 
higher than 0.28. 
A test of flexibility in hours is based on the fitted values from the labor supply equation. All full-
time agents have fitted hours worked of at least 20 per week, implying that none want to work 
part time. Only 1% of part-time agents have fitted weekly hours above 20, and the highest is 
21.8. Agents are working the hours they want to, rather than those they must. 
The next section provides background of the wages and hours literature. A theoretical model 
based on the agent choosing full- or part-time work follows. Data and empirical findings are 
reported subsequently. The last section describes conclusions and implications. 
Background 
Relatively low labor supply elasticities have been obtained, regardless of worker 
characteristics. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) survey wage and income elasticities of hours 
worked. Uncompensated wage elasticities for men range from zero to 0.14. Income elasticities 
range between −0.28 and 0.01. Those estimates are for all workers, many of who have no control 
over the number of hours they work. 
Research on the labor supply of workers who set their own hours has inconclusive 
findings. Farber (2005) finds that taxicab drivers have a low but positive labor supply elasticity 
of 0.5 and a positive intertemporal substitution on work. Camerer et al. (1997) find opposite 
results of a backward-bending negative labor supply elasticity. Positive results have been 
obtained for stadium vendors (Oettinger 1999). Vendors work a fixed number of hours per day, 
but they can choose which days to work. 
Within real estate, Hsieh and Moretti (2003) examine the productivity and hours of agents. 
Productivity declines as does the wage when free entry is permitted in expensive housing 
markets. Jud and Winkler (1998, 2000) find high labor supply elasticities in licensing 
requirements, but low returns to formal schooling. In the link between real estate and 
work, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) show that increased population density leads to lower hours 
worked. 
A household's structure may affect wages and hours. In Carroll and Clauretie (2000) marital 
status and household size affect earnings of agents in insurance and finance but not in real 
estate. Turnbull and Dombrow (2007) find that compensation differentials of agents do not differ 
by gender. 
While the real estate studies have addressed returns in earnings, they do not make the separate 
allocation to wages and hours that determine the supply elasticity. The amount of effort may 
respond to the wage as well as skills and demographic variables. That decision requires a 
breakdown of compensation between hours and wages. The structure can test whether the 
relatively low return to education in real estate is robust to the specification or whether the 
market rewards a different type of skill. 
Model 
The structural model is recursive. The real estate agent chooses between full- or part-time 
positions. Conditional on that decision, the labor market offers productivity or a wage function as 
the return on acquired skills. Within the full- or part-time markets and given the wage, the agent 
chooses effort or hours worked. 
The agent has characteristics X including assets and wealth, other income, skills and personal 
and protected variables. Skills include education, experience and extent of real estate holdings. 
Personal variables include household income and marital status, which facilitate networking and 
productivity. Variables protected against discrimination such as race, gender and ethnicity are 
not part of employment arrangements, but they may enter individual decisions. 
The agent makes a work choice indexed by I. Full-time work involves I = 1 with I = 0 for a 
part timer. Each of full- and part-time status offers an opportunity set of wages and hours (WI, 
HI) conditional on skills and personal variables. The part-time labor market offers lower hoursH, 
so H1 > H0. Hourly wages are W0, W1, which is not necessarily lower in the part-time market. 
The agent's utility is UI(CI, − HI, X), I = 0, 1. Utility is increasing and concave in consumption 
of goods and services CI and the negative of hours worked − HI given characteristics X. The 
price of the consumption goods is normalized at one. 
Total time available for work is ρI. The marginal tax rate is τ. Household income from assets and 
labor income other than real estate sales isY. The agent selects the alternative that maximizes 
utility VI or 
(1) 
The budget constraint is (1 −τ)(ρI WI + Y) − CI − (1 −τ)WI(ρI− HI) ≥ 0.3 Full income after tax 
if the agent worked every hour is (1 −τ)ρI WI. After-tax other income is (1 −τ)Y. That total 
income is spent on consumption CI and on time not working (1 −τ)WI(ρI− HI). 
Including income and the wage in the characteristics X, whether an agent works full time or part 
time depends on 
(2) 
As a linear specification, I*= Xα+υ. Here α are parameters and the expected intensity is E(I*) = 
Xα. A disturbance term υ has zero mean with E(υ) = 0. The agent works full time when Xα+υ≥ 0, 
yielding 
(3) 
The unconditional wage, differing between the full-time and the part-time markets is 
(4) 
Here XW is the list of variables determining the wage with parameters β and error ɛ. 
For full-time agents with I = 1 the parameters are β1, θ1 with disturbance ɛ1. For part timers 
with I = 0 the corresponding parameters and disturbance are β0, θ0, ɛ0. The errors for the 
selection and the two wages (υ, ɛ1, ɛ0) have variance-covariance matrix 
(5) 
The expected values of the disturbances contingent on the choices are 
(6) 
The density and distribution functions of the disturbance υ are f and F. 
In (6) mi  i = 0, 1 is the inverse Mills ratio that adjusts for the self-selection between full- and 
part-time status. The coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is δi i = 0, 1. Some agents have a 
network of family and friends or a network from social contacts that produce customers and sales 
at low cost. This network causes a positive self-selection on the part-time coefficient δ0. If part 
timers are less skilled, then there is a negative self-selection and δ0 < 0. The wage equations, 
corrected for self-selection are 
(7) 
The fitted wages are  in the full- and part-time sectors. These fitted wages together with 
tax rates determine the labor supply functions recursively as 
(8) 
The exogenous variables are XH with parameters γ. The labor supply elasticity is η if hours and 
the after-tax fitted wage are in logarithms. Logarithmic after-tax income is (1 
−τ)Y, and φ is the income elasticity. The error in hours is ω. 
In the unrestricted case there are five equations, for selection between full- and part-time status 
in (3) with two separate wages and hours in(7) and (8). Testable restrictions reduce the structure 
to as few as two equations, one each for wages and hours. If the δ are zero there is no self-
selection and 
(9) 
Full- and part-time agents do not differ in their networks or other unmeasured variables. The 
system reduces to four equations, two for wages and two for hours. Full- and part-time agents 
have the same wage or productivity, and there is no self-selection when 
(10) 
There is one equation for wages along with two for hours. 
Agents have no difference in effort in full- and part-time markets when 
(11) 
Together with conditions (10) where there is no self-selection and common productivity, the 
system contains two equations. In the two-equation recursive system the wage and hours are 
(12) 
There is a single wage equation W that pools over full- and part-time workers. That estimation 
occurs first, yielding fitted value . That fitted wage enters the hours equation with supply 
elasticity η. The five-equation system reduces to two under the test restrictions (10) and (11). 
The specifications are used to test real estate agent work flexibility. Skills such as experience 
allow an agent to be more productive. That productivity implies β > 0, whether for full- or part-
time or all markets. If the agent is able to work more efficiently, it requires less effort to sell a 
house, so γ < 0. With the wage and hours measured in logarithms, the total return in income from 
one unit of investment, such as a year of experience, is W + H. The associated rate of return is 
the derivative with respect to that characteristic, or β+γ. A skill allows total earnings to rise even 
if effort declines, leading to |β| > |γ|. The gain in productivity is partially spent on reducing effort 
if γ < 0, but there remains a gain in total earnings. 
Even if hours are flexible, the earnings target theory indicates a backward-bending labor supply 
elasticity, or η < 0. Agents are working flexible hours including being part time, and they have a 
threshold total earnings. The alternative is that there is flexible response and hours are increased 
when incentives rise with η > 1. All of these tests apply to the complete system (3), 
(7) and (8) and any restrictive form including the two equations in (12). 
Equations (3) and (12) are estimated after categorizing the variables into five groups. These 
categories are: (a) protected: gender, race, ethnicity; (b) personal: marital status, household 
income; (c) skills: education, experience, real estate investments, real estate as second career; (d) 
firm: size, ownership structure and (e) market: employment, employment growth. 
Variables in a given category are included or excluded from the estimating equations.4 The 
probit equation includes protected, personal and skill category variables; firm and market 
variables are assumed not to affect the part-time versus full-time employment decision. The 
wage equations have personal, skills, firm and market categories as well as the fitted probit 
values. Protected variables for gender, ethnicity and race are excluded from initial wages and 
hours equations. They are included later for robustness checks. The hours equations include 
personal and skill categories and the fitted after-tax wages, but they exclude firm and market 
category variables. The exclusion is based on recognition that individuals control their own hours 
rather than the firm or market. 
The recursive system does not have interdependence among the endogenous variables. In the 
probit, only the dependent variable is endogenous. The wage and self-selection are endogenous 
in the productivity or wage equations. Hours and the fitted wage are endogenous in the effort or 
hours equations. The wage is conditional on the probit, using the two-step Heckman 
(1979) method. Hours are conditional on the after-tax wage and income. 
Data and Empirical Results 
The data are from a survey of real estate agents in residential sales conducted in the spring of 
2005 by the National Association of Realtors. There are 8,450 respondents with data on total 
compensation, hours worked, education, experience, gender, race, ethnicity, household income 
and sufficient characteristics to estimate the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate is calculated 
from the TAXSIM model using the residence of the agent.5 That residence by ZIP code is 
matched with employment growth and unemployment rates in the local market. 
Total gross annual compensation includes all income from sales or listing of residential property. 
Agents report annual business expenses including car, rental and office expenses. Those business 
expenses are subtracted from total gross compensation to yield annual net earnings. Net earnings 
divided by hours worked per week yields the hourly wage. The hourly wage is on an annualized 
basis. The variables are summarized and described in Table 1 including means and standard 
deviations. 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Total Sample Part-Time Sample Full-Time Sample 
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Asian 2.039 14.136 3972 5.508 22.839 472 1.571 12.439 3500 
Black 4.053 19.723 3972 7.839 26.907 472 3.543 18.489 3500 
Broker 21.073 40.788 3972 15.254 35.993 472 21.857 41.334 3500 
Dec04emp 1.100 1.018 2922 1.198 1.101 365 1.086 1.005 2557 
Empgrwth 1.257 1.256 2922 1.224 1.342 365 1.261 1.243 2557 
Exp 11.511 10.309 3944 10.591 10.840 468 11.635 10.230 3476 
Fedsttax 39.047 2.007 3830 38.918 1.949 445 39.064 2.014 3385 
Female 55.715 49.679 3972 57.203 49.531 472 55.514 49.702 3500 
FT 88.117 32.363 3972 0.000 0.000 472 100.000 0.000 3500 
Indfr 35.851 47.962 3972 25.000 43.347 472 37.314 48.371 3500 
Native 0.730 8.514 3972 0.636 7.955 472 0.743 8.588 3500 
Latin 3.122 17.393 3972 2.754 16.383 472 3.171 17.526 3500 
Lhrs 3.643 0.513 3972 2.565 0.566 472 3.789 0.278 3500 
Lnatw 6.276 1.111 3830 6.488 0.986 445 6.249 1.123 3385 
Lnhinc 11.351 0.842 3972 11.206 0.735 472 11.371 0.854 3500 
Lnwage 6.773 1.113 3972 6.988 1.001 472 6.744 1.124 3500 
Lsfsizf 3.942 1.986 3972 3.312 2.035 472 4.027 1.964 3500 
Married 73.263 44.264 3972 76.271 42.587 472 72.857 44.476 3500 
Owner 1.032 10.109 3972 1.271 11.215 472 1.000 9.951 3500 
Resprop 1.277 3.820 3963 1.028 2.424 471 1.311 3.970 3492 
Sch 14.686 1.978 3968 14.945 2.066 471 14.651 1.964 3497 
Seccar 95.619 20.469 3972 96.398 18.653 472 95.514 20.702 3500 
Notes: The data include responses from a 2005 survey of 8,450 residential real estate licensees. 
Marginal tax rates were downloaded from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim. The ZIP code is used to determine total employment and the 
employment growth in local markets. Asian is the percentage of Asian American agents in 
percentage points, Black is the percentage that are African American, Broker is the percentage 
that are brokers, Dec04emp is the employment in millions in the metropolitan area in 
December, 2004, Empgrwth is annual employment growth, Exp is years of experience, 
Fedsttax is the federal plus state percent tax rate applicable to the metropolitan area, Female is 
the percentage of female agents, FT is the percentage of full timers, defined as working more 
than 20 hours per week, Indfr is the percentage working in independent franchise offices, 
Native is the percentage of American Indian licensees, Latin is the percentage that are 
Americans of Hispanic heritage, Lhrs is the natural log of hours worked per week, Lnatw is 
the natural log of after-tax net annualized wages, Lnhinc is the natural log of the net annual 
household income, Lnwage is the natural log of the net annualized wage, Lsfsizf is the natural 
log of the brokerage firm size defined by number of employees, Married is the percentage 
married, Owner is the percentage who are owners, Resprop is the number of residential 
properties held for investment purposes, Sch is the number of years of schooling based on the 
highest level of education completed, and Seccar is the percentage whose second career is real 
estate. 
Table 2 reports the probit estimates for the probability along with the marginal effects of being 
employed full versus part time. Married agents are less likely to work full time as are Asian and 
African Americans. The probability of full-time status increases with household income. 
Table 2.  Probit estimates: Probability of working full or part time 
Variable Probit Model Marginal Effects 
Coefficient t ratio p value Coefficient t ratio p value Elasticity 
Constant   0.4300 1.004 0.315 0.0827 1.004 0.316   
Sch  −0.0414 −3.081 0.002 −0.0080 −3.089 0.002 −0.132 
Exp   0.0012 0.460 0.645 0.0002 0.460 0.645 0.003 
Seccar  −0.0322 −0.233 0.816 −0.0062 −0.233 0.816 −0.007 
Resprop   0.0061 0.703 0.482 0.0012 0.703 0.482 0.002 
Married  −0.1952 −3.036 0.002 −0.0376 −3.045 0.002 −0.031 
Female  −0.0709 −1.314 0.189 −0.0136 −1.314 0.189 −0.009 
Black  −0.4613 −4.030 0.000 −0.0888 −4.031 0.000 −0.004 
Asian  −0.6620 −4.367 0.000 −0.1274 −4.357 0.000 −0.003 
Native   0.0939 0.296 0.768 0.0181 0.296 0.768 0.000 
Latin   0.0611 0.393 0.694 0.0118 0.393 0.694 0.000 
Lnhinc   0.1415 4.131 0.000 0.0272 4.151 0.000 0.349 
Log Likelihood −1,395.08 
Chi Squared 71.74 
N 3,931 
Notes: Probit model results are of full-time versus part-time employment based on a 2005 
National Association of Realtors survey of 8,450 residential real estate sales professionals. 
Coefficients are heteroskedastic consistent. Missing data results in a sample size of 3,931 
observations. Sch is years of schooling based on the highest level of education completed, Exp 
is years of real estate experience, Seccar = 1 if respondent's second career is real estate, 
Resprop is the number of residential properties held for investment purposes, Married = 1 if 
married, Female = 1 if female, Black = 1 if African American, Asian = 1 if Asian American, 
Native = 1 if Native American, Latin = 1 if of Latin descent, and Lnhinc = the natural log of 
household income. 
Estimates of the wage function are in Table 3. A test on full- and part-time subsamples indicates 
that the wage coefficients are not equal.6 The full- and part-time wage estimates are reported in 
addition to those for the combined sample, and they are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 3.  Hourly wage regressions: full time, part time and combined. 
Variable Full-Time Sample Part-Time Sample Combined Sample 
Coefficient t 
ratio 
p 
value 
Coefficient t 
ratio 
p 
value 
Coefficient t 
ratio 
p 
value 
Intercept −1.7277 −3.942 0.000 3.5729 2.397 0.017 −1.4525 −4.378 0.000 
Sch 0.0006 0.059 0.953 0.0088 0.325 0.745 0.0045 0.536 0.592 
Exp 0.0247 14.016 0.000 0.0123 2.531 0.011 0.0231 13.626 0.000 
Seccar −0.1290 −1.595 0.111 0.1144 0.440 0.660 −0.1142 −1.913 0.056 
Resprop −0.0025 −0.515 0.607 0.0841 4.284 0.000 0.0030 0.464 0.643 
Married −1.1111 −2.321 0.020 −3.2233 −1.922 0.055 −0.8138 −1.729 0.084 
Broker 0.0939 2.177 0.029 0.1214 0.815 0.415 0.0688 1.856 0.063 
Owner −0.1040 −0.568 0.570 −0.7215 −1.731 0.083 −0.1633 −0.926 0.354 
Indfr 0.1239 3.571 0.000 −0.0440 −0.381 0.703 0.0879 2.670 0.008 
Lsfsizf 0.0032 0.364 0.716 0.0312 1.249 0.212 −0.0036 −0.424 0.672 
Empgrwth 0.0336 2.467 0.014 0.0652 1.806 0.071 0.0384 2.796 0.005 
Dec04emp 0.0130 0.768 0.443 0.0688 1.550 0.121 0.0246 1.528 0.126 
Lnhinc 0.7342 19.608 0.000 0.2584 1.840 0.066 0.7089 25.091 0.000 
Lnhinc * 
Married 
0.0762 1.790 0.073 0.2871 1.887 0.059 0.0527 1.265 0.206 
Self−Sel. −0.0638 −0.184 0.854 −0.1472 −0.457 0.648       
(m) 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.19 0.40 
F Statistic 144.22 6.89 146.17 
Log 
Likelihood 
−3,114.96 −463.68 −3,659.87 
N 2,532 361 2,893 
Notes: Regression results for full-time, part-time and all workers are based on a 2005 National 
Association of Realtors survey of residential licensees. Full time and part time are sample 
selection regressions that include self-selection from the employment probit model in Table 2. 
Regression coefficients are heteroskedasticity consistent. Dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of annualized hourly wage. Sch is years of schooling based on the highest level of 
education completed, Exp is years of real estate experience, Seccar = 1 if the respondent's 
second career is real estate, Resprop is the number of residential properties held for investment 
purposes, Married = 1 if married, Broker = 1 if a real estate broker, Owner = 1 if the owner 
of a brokerage firm, Indfr = 1 if working in an independent office of a national franchise, 
Lsfsizf is the natural log of brokerage firm size measured by the number of employees, 
Empgrwth is the employment growth in the metropolitan area in percent, Dec04emp 
employment is the total employment in millions in the metropolitan area reported in December 
2004, Lnhinc = the natural log of household income, and m is the sample selection inverse 
Mills ratio from the probit model. 
Part-time agents spend their time differently than full-time agents. The ratio of listing 
acquisitions to sales is 66% for part timers versus 85% for full timers, suggesting potential latent 
effects.7 Part timers do not have unobserved skills that lead to higher wages. The coefficient on 
the self-selection m1 is negative but statistically insignificant at the 5% level for the full-time and 
part-time samples in Table 3. 
Another year of experience raises the hourly wage of a full-time agent by 2.5%. A year of 
experience raises the hourly wage of a part-time agent by 1.2%, about one-half the return of the 
full timer. An additional year of schooling does not increase wages for either group. 
The coefficient for entering real estate after a career elsewhere is statistically significant in the 
combined sample but disappears in the subsamples. In the combined sample, those whose first 
career was real estate earn 10.8% more than when an agent is a subsequent choice.8 Residential 
property held as investments leads to a higher wage only in the part-time sample. Part timers 
earn a return to experience in real estate investment that full timers gain elsewhere. 
For full-time agents, the elasticity of the wage in household income is 0.73. For part-time 
workers the corresponding estimate is 0.26. Marital status has no effect when including a 
multiplicative variable with household income. The higher household income predominantly 
reflects agents who are married. 
Full-time agents who are affiliated with an independent franchise have an hourly wage 13.2% 
higher; for the combined sample the increase is 9.2%. Firm size is not statistically significant. 
The general economic environment has a positive impact on wages for the complete sample. The 
elasticity of the wage with respect to employment growth is 3.4. For the combined sample, 
wages rise 3.8% per 1% increase in employment growth. The size of the market in the level of 
employment is not statistically significant. 
The labor supply estimates are in Table 4. All regressions in this table employ two-stage least 
squares. The fitted values of annualized wages are estimated in the first step. These are converted 
to after-tax wages using TAXSIM. The natural logarithm of the resulting after-tax wages is used 
in the labor supply equations for full- and part-time agents. 
Table 4.  Hours worked regressions: full time, part time and combined. 
Variable 2SLS Full-Time Sample 2SLS Part-Time Sample 2SLS Combined Sample 
Coef. t 
ratio 
p 
value 
Coef. t 
ratio 
p 
value 
Coef. t 
ratio 
p 
value 
Intercept 3.5754 13.772 0.000 3.9640 3.908 0.000 3.5545 9.805 0.000 
Sch 0.0035 0.980 0.327 −0.0278 −2.009 0.045 −0.0134 −2.456 0.014 
Exp −0.0058 −2.538 0.011 0.0049 1.489 0.137 −0.0034 −0.988 0.323 
Seccar 0.0498 1.566 0.117 −0.3042 −4.015 0.000 −0.0072 −0.183 0.855 
Resprop 0.0021 0.719 0.472 −0.0094 −0.425 0.671 0.0009 0.273 0.785 
Married 0.3315 1.405 0.160 0.1935 0.167 0.867 −0.2747 −0.869 0.385 
Broker 0.0224 1.267 0.205 −0.0537 −0.668 0.504 0.0723 2.850 0.004 
Lnatw 0.2137 2.416 0.016 −0.0750 −0.353 0.724 0.1550 1.087 0.277 
Lnhinc −0.1025 −1.522 0.128 −0.0238 −0.264 0.792 −0.0559 −0.538 0.591 
Lnhinc * 
Married 
−0.0290 −1.446 0.148 −0.0145 −0.138 0.891 0.0202 0.746 0.456 
Log Likelihood −839.76 −263.16 −2,350.02 
N 2,489 344 2,833 
Notes: Two-stage least squares (2SLS) labor supply regression results for full-time, part-time 
and all workers are based on a 2005 National Association of Realtors survey of residential real 
estate sales professionals. Regression coefficients are heteroskedasticity consistent. Dependent 
variable is the natural log of hours worked per week. Sch is years of schooling based on the 
highest level of education completed, Exp is years of real estate experience, Seccar = 1 if the 
respondent's second career is real estate, Resprop is the number of residential properties held 
for investment purposes, Married = 1 if married, Broker = 1 if a real estate broker, Lnatw is 
the natural log of net annualized after-tax wages predicted from the wage function (Table 3), and 
Lnhinc = the natural log of household income. 
Of particular interest is the effect of experience on hours worked. Full-time agents decrease their 
hours by 0.58% with each year of experience, conditional on the hourly wage. The experience 
coefficient in the hours-worked equation is opposite in sign to those in the wage equation. Skill 
increases the wage. Conditional on the wage, skill reduces effort. 
A full-time agent with 11 years of experience works 6.4% fewer hours than a rookie. Full timers 
work 44 hours a week on average, as shown in Table 1. In comparison with part-time agents, the 
difference in hours worked is 2.8 hours a week or 140 hours per year. The agent with 11 years of 
experience receives a 27.2% higher hourly wage than the rookie, according to Table 3. Adding 
the effort and productivity effects as −0.064 and 0.272, total earnings are 20.8% higher for the 
11-year full-time veteran as compared with the rookie.9 
For part timers, the experience coefficient in the hours equation is not statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Table 3 indicates that total wages for part-time agents increase by 13.5% for 11-
year veterans compared to rookies. Full timers have a 7.3% higher total earnings return as a 
premium over part timers. That premium is earned by a full timer receiving more experience per 
year than a part timer. 
Hours worked by part-time agents decrease with schooling by an average of 2.8% per year. 
Schooling is not statistically significant in the wages equation. More educated part timers are not 
more productive, but they economize on effort. 
Brokers work 7.5% more hours in the combined sample. Having made real estate a career leads 
to a higher wage and lower hours. For the combined sample, the decrease in wages is 10.8% for 
those who choose real estate as a second career. 
Marital status and household income are not statistically significant in the hours regression. The 
interaction of these variables is not statistically significant. Higher household income does not 
lead to substitution of work for leisure, and marriage does not affect hours. Owning investment 
properties does not lead to spending more time as an agent on listing and selling. Brokers work 
more hours than agents in the combined sample. 
The elasticity of labor supply with respect to the after-tax wage is 0.21 for the full-time sample. 
This estimate is positive and significant with a t statistic of 2.4. The elasticity of supply for part 
timers was zero. Table 4 has separate wage and income elasticities. Uncompensated Marshallian 
wage elasticities with hours H and wage W are . Compensated Hicksian wage 
elasticities from the Slutsky equation are , where  is the income 
elasticity in after-tax income (1 −τ)Y. Hicksian elasticities are larger when leisure is a normal 
good. In Table 4, the income elasticity estimates are negative, indicating that leisure is a normal 
good, but they are not significant. Consequently, the compensated and uncompensated wage 
elasticities can be viewed as the same, or ηc=ηu. 
Farber (2005) finds positive but low uncompensated labor supply elasticities for those who can 
choose their own hours. Camerer et al. (1997) find negative supply elasticities if there is an 
earnings target. That is not the case for real estate licensees. Agents are not targeting a specific 
total earnings level. Instead, they respond positively to after-tax wages. 
Table 5 reports tests for equality of the paired parameters in the wage and hours equations for 
agents. Experience leads to a 2.5% increase in hourly wages for full timers and 1.2% for part 
timers. This 1.3% differential is statistically significant at the 5% level in Table 5. Hours worked 
decrease by 0.58% per year of experience for full timers but increase by 0.49% for part timers. 
This differential is statistically significant from zero at the 1% level. Statistically significant 
differentials are evident for investments in residential property and household income in wages 
and for having real estate as not a first career in hours. 
Table 5.  Tests for equality of coefficients, full time versus part time. 
Wage Regressions Hours Worked Regressions 
Variable Coefficient 
Difference 
t value Variable Coefficient 
Difference 
t value 
Sch −0.0082 0.286 Sch 0.0313 2.191* 
Exp 0.0124 2.393* Exp −0.0107 2.670** 
Seccar −0.2433 0.893 Seccar 0.3540 4.309** 
Resprop −0.0866 4.285** Resprop 0.0115 0.513 
Married 2.1122 1.211 Married 0.1380 0.117 
Broker −0.0275 0.177 Broker 0.0761 0.924 
Owner 0.6175 1.357 Lnatw 0.2887 1.256 
Indfr 0.1679 1.393 Lnhinc 
Married 
−0.0786 0.698 
Lsfsixf −0.0280 1.059 Lnhinc * −0.0145 0.135 
Empgrwth −0.0316 0.820       
Dec04emp −0.0558 1.175       
Lnhinc 0.4758 3.275**       
Lnhinc * 
Married 
−0.2109 1.335       
m 0.0834 0.176       
Notes: We present test statistics for differences in the part-time versus full-time regression 
coefficients for the wage and labor supply regressions. These t tests assume unequal subsample 
variances (Greene 2007). The significance levels are denoted by ** for 0.01 and * for 0.05. Sch 
is years of schooling based on the highest level of education completed, Exp is years of real 
estate experience, Seccar = 1 if the respondent's second career is real estate, Resprop is the 
number of residential properties held for investment purposes, Married = 1 if married, Broker 
= 1 if a real estate broker, Owner = 1 for owing the firm, Indfr = 1 for being in an independent 
franchise office, Lsfsizf is the natural log of the brokerage firm size defined by number of 
employees, Empgrwth is the percent annual employment growth, Dec04emp is employment in 
millions in the metropolitan area in December 2004, Lnatw is the natural log of after-tax net 
annualized wages, and Lnhinc = the natural log of household income. 
After the first year, a full-time worker has a 2.5% higher wage but works 0.6% fewer hours, so 
total earnings rise by 1.9%. Skill leads to a productivity effect, increasing output per hour and 
allowing fewer work hours and more time for leisure. Part timers and full timers are benefiting 
from productivity gains, spending part of the gain by working fewer hours. 
Full timers and part timers earn positive returns to experience. For the full-time sample, more 
experienced workers work fewer hours. For the part-time sample, schooling reduces hours 
worked. 
The findings are consistent with previous research in other occupations. Skilled workers at the 
aggregate level may be working more hours (Prescott, Rogerson and Wallenius 2006). Over 
time, skilled workers are taking less leisure as time not worked, and the less skilled are taking 
more (Aguiar and Hurst 2007). Those estimates do not control for full- and part-time status and 
do not adjust for what happens within the same job classification. 
While the sorting is between full- and part-time workers on total hours, the estimating equations 
are separate for each status. The fitted values of the hours worked may be less than 20 per week 
for a full-time agent and more than that for one on part-time status. The result is a 
misclassification. Some people are working part time when they would rather have a full-time 
job or vice versa. As a robustness test, the fitted hours worked per week are obtained for each 
agent. Those hours were tested for being at least 20 weekly among full timers and no more than 
that for part timers. 
All full-time agents have predicted hours worked of at least 20 per week. For the 344 part timers, 
there are four or about 1% who have fitted hours of more than 20 weekly. For these four, the 
highest fitted value is 21.8 weekly hours. The lowest is 20.005. The strongest work demand 
among part timers is for 21.8 hours a week, essentially retaining part-time status. This test 
confirms the flexibility of hours among real estate agents. Virtually all agents are working the 
hours they want, not those they are obliged to. 
Protected variables are defined formally in U.S. legislation. Workers having these protected 
characteristics cannot be discriminated against, harassed or paid differently. These protected 
variables are race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age above 40, family status, disability, veteran 
status, sexual orientation and political affiliation. Underlying the assumption is that fundamental 
productivity is not different by a protected variable. To test this condition, the protected variables 
available for gender, race and ethnicity are included in the wage equation. 
The hours equation is reestimated with the fitted values from this wage equation. In Table 6, the 
hourly wage does not differ by gender, race or ethnicity for real estate agents. All of the 
coefficients on race, gender and ethnicity are insignificantly different from zero. Retaining 
significance are total household income, with an wage elasticity greater than one, and 
experience. One more year of experience increases the hourly wage by 2%. 
Table 6.  Hourly wage and hours worked regressions with protected variables for the full-time 
sample. 
Variable Wages: Full-Time Sample Hours: 2SLS Full-Time Sample 
Coef. t ratio p value Coef. t ratio p value 
Intercept −5.0841 −1.161 0.246 3.7178 15.169 0.000 
Sch −0.1002 −0.823 0.411 0.0036 0.910 0.363 
Exp 0.0275 3.328 0.001 −0.0075 −4.009 0.000 
Seccar −0.1875 −0.513 0.608 0.0588 1.753 0.080 
Resprop 0.0084 0.332 0.740 0.0022 0.686 0.493 
Married −1.9078 −0.852 0.394 0.4164 1.693 0.090 
Broker 0.0900 0.479 0.632 0.0174 0.940 0.347 
Owner −0.1552 −0.192 0.847 – – – 
Female −0.2376 −0.964 0.335 – – – 
Black −1.4704 −0.925 0.355 – – – 
Asian −1.8457 −0.747 0.455 – – – 
Native 0.4922 0.530 0.596 – – – 
Latin 0.2289 0.544 0.586 – – – 
Indfr 0.1156 0.766 0.444 – – – 
Lsfsizf 0.0034 0.088 0.930 – – – 
Empgrwth 0.0296 0.498 0.618 – – – 
Dec04emp 0.0077 0.104 0.917 – – – 
Lnhinc 1.0590 2.578 0.010 −0.1525 −2.787 0.005 
Lnhinc * Married 0.1062 0.568 0.570 − – – 
Self-Sel. (m) 7.6667 0.861 0.389 −0.0350 −1.645 0.100 
Lnatw – – –  0.2819 4.067 0.000 
Log Likelihood −3,099.32     −1,088.55     
N  2,532      2,489     
Notes: Regression results for full-time workers are based on a 2005 National Association of 
Realtors survey of residential licensees. The full-time sample selection regression includes self-
selection from the employment probit model in Table 2. Regression coefficients are 
heteroskedasticity consistent. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annualized hourly 
wage. Sample selection based on probit model in Table 2. Sch is years of schooling based on 
the highest level of education completed, Exp is years of real estate experience, Seccar = 1 if 
respondent's second career is real estate, Resprop is the number of residential properties held 
for investment purposes, Married = 1 if married, Broker = 1 if a real estate broker, Owner = 
1 if owner of a brokerage firm, Female = 1 if female, Black = 1 if African American, Asian = 
1 if Asian American, Native = 1 if Native American, Latin = 1 if of Latin descent, Indfr = 1 if 
working in an independent office of a national franchise, Lsfsizf is the natural log of brokerage 
firm size measured by the number of employees, Empgrwth is the employment growth in the 
metropolitan area in percent, Dec04emp employment is the total employment in millions in the 
metropolitan area reported in December 2004, Lnhinc = the natural log of household income, m 
is the sample selection inverse Mills ratio from the probit model, and Lnatw is the natural log of 
net annualized after-tax wages predicted from the wage function (Table 3). 2SLS = two-stage 
least squares. 
These fitted wages are converted to an after-tax basis and the hours reestimated, with results 
reported in Table 6. The resulting labor supply elasticity is 0.28, with a t statistic exceeding 4 
and similar to that in Table 3. The collinearity among protected and other variables, along with 
limited degrees of freedom led to a singularity in the part-time equation. That singularity 
prevents part timers and full timers from being compared. Given the similarity in elasticities, the 
results of Tables 3–5 are supported with a more general wage specification. 
Conclusion 
Real estate agents have the flexibility of choosing hours worked and their employers. Based on 
characteristics and preferences, agents select full- or part-time work. The market responds with 
an hourly wage based on skills and conditional on the choice. The agent constructs an after-tax 
hourly wage and household income in determining hours worked. There are up to five estimating 
equations for the self-selection between full- and part-time work and conditional wages and 
hours. 
Job-related skills include education, experience and whether a person has invested in a firm or 
the industry. Agents can invest by obtaining skills such as education or experience or by buying 
houses, shown to have a return in Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2005). The findings indicate 
that full- and part-time workers increase their wages through experience, although full timers 
benefit almost double as much for each additional year of experience. Schooling does not 
increase the hourly wage for either group. 
On the firm level, these results have productivity and contract incentive implications for workers 
and their employers. On a macro level, there are relevant taxation and productivity effects. 
Future research may seek to examine other workers who set their own hours to determine 
whether the findings are unique to real estate. 
Footnotes 
1. The payment of a commission for real estate transactions remains the predominant contract for 
sales. Miceli, Pancak and Sirmans (2007) raise issues as to the optimality and obsolescence of 
the contract. There are 3.2 million real estate licensees in the United States as of January 2008, 
according to the membership tracker http://www.arello.org. 
2. That definition follows regulations for qualified pension plans. A definition of 20 hours per 
week over a 50-week year is used for eligibility. Employers have responded by using these rules 
to classify part timers as those working fewer than this hourly number as not being eligible for 
pensions and other benefits. 
3. In an intertemporal context with time as a subscript and assets Vt(At, t) = max [Ut(Ct, Ht, Xt) 
+κ Vt(At+1, t + 1)] where κ where is a discount factor. The optimal conditions are 
 
Here  is the marginal utility of wealth, ψ is the discount factor and At is assets. These are 
the same atemporal conditions, with the Euler equation. The consumer chooses savings, with 
discount rate ψ (1 + rt+1). 
4. The wages equation also includes Owner and Broker dummy variables, while the hours 
equation includes the Broker variable. It may be argued that the Broker variable be not only a 
status in the brokerage firm but also related to skills, while the Owner variable could be a skill 
or personal variable depending on one's perspective. 
5. Subsample sizes for ethnicity and gender can be estimated by multiplying the respective 
dummy variable coefficient by the full sample size. See Richard and Coutts (1993) for a 
discussion of the TAXSIM model. The National Bureau of Economic Research suggests the use 
of TAXSIM to estimate marginal tax rates. The data were downloaded 
from http://www.nber.org/~taxsim. 
6. The Chow (1960) test compares the residual sum of squares of the combined sample versus 
the subsamples. The calculated F statistic is 10.89, which exceeds the critical value at the 5% 
level of significance. 
7. Part-time sales professionals acquired an average of 4.08 listings per year and sold 6.16 
listings, while full timers acquired 14.36 listings and sold 16.90 listings. 
8. The transformation for dummy variable coefficients in the natural log regression is y = ex − 
1 where x is the regression coefficient and y is the transformed value. 
9. The effect on total productivity is determined as (1 +Δw)(1 +Δh) − 1 where Δw is the 
percentage change in the wage rate and Δh is the percentage change in the hours worked. 
We are grateful to Peter Bearse, Paul Bishop, Edward Coulson, Donald Jud, Ellen Roche and 
two referees for their comments and suggestions. 
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